

Valuation of flexible capacities in intraday and balancing energy markets

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Energy Finance Christmas Workshop
Wroclaw, 11 – 12 December 2025

Overview

- Compare revenue potential of flexible capacities on intraday and balancing energy markets for Germany
- Concentrate on 15 min products; bid sizes 1 MW, 2 MW, ...
- Modelling as financial option (strike price = variable generation costs)
- Focus on last 30 min before delivery
→ different liquidity in the four balancing areas
- Extract volume-weighted transaction prices from reconstructed order book (sell to bid, buy at ask)
- Result: Similar profit opportunities on both markets
(exception illiquid TransnetBW area)

Context: Project DigIPlat

- DigIPlat = Digital Solutions for Interoperability of Flexibility Platforms
- Consortium of research institutions and transmission system operators (funded by ERA-Net, see footer)
 - Development of new digital approaches for interoperability along the ICT, process-related, and economic dimensions
 - Standardized framework for interoperable platforms and flexibility requirements
 - Use cases for cross-border and cross-platform coordination of flexibility for redispatch, balancing energy, and intraday markets (focus on DACH region)

DigIPlat: Economic Evaluation of Use Cases


- Aspect of interoperability: "All-rounder product"
 - Coordinated procurement of balancing power and redispatch (Zobernig et al., 2025)
 - Integration of bids for 15' products from the intraday market (IDM) order book into the bid list on the balancing energy market (BEM) before its gate closure
→ our focus for market area DE (liquidity, data availability)
- Bids on the IDM & BEM are not fully compatible from an economic perspective:
 - Will a bid on the BEM be accepted and then actually activated?
 - Different energy deliveries and compensation (IDM: traded quantity over a full 15 minutes; BEM: activation duration uncertain)
- Questions:
 - Supplier perspective: Are additional incentives needed (e.g., premiums) so that qualified suppliers allow the transfer of ID bids to the BEM?
 - Transmission system operator (TSO) perspective: Potential increase in the volume of available bids on the BEM?

Short-term markets for flexibility

- **Intraday Market (IDM):**
 - Allows trading based on new information after the closing of the day-ahead market; 60' and 15' products
 - DE: Continuous trading from 3:00 PM (D – 1) until 5 minutes before delivery begins; SIDC until T – 60, trading within DE until T – 30, then only within the respective control area (SDAT)
 - Each transaction has its own price
- **Balancing Energy Market (BEM) for Automatic Frequency Restauration Reserve (aFRR):**
 - 15' product time slices each for positive & negative aFRR
 - Gate Closure at T – 25 (Auction): Awarded suppliers on the balancing capacity market must submit a bid; additional free bids are possible
 - Since June 2022: Bids are forwarded to the European PICASSO platform (December 2022: no release of unapproved bids), activation after merit order
 - Settlement of the delivered energy at the uniform price (CBMP)

Trading volumes IDM (15 min products)

- Trading volume varies depending on the product and tends to increase significantly towards the end of the trading session.
- Three different trading phases:
 - (1) SIDC
 - (2) Trading within DE and
 - (3) own balancing area (SDAT)
- Significantly different liquidity depending on the balancing area (trading volume, bid-ask spreads)
- In "illiquid" area possibly no transaction in last 30 min




Transaction volume per minute for a 15-minute product with delivery at night (00:00 – 00:15, left) and during the day (11:45 – 12:00, right) in the last six hours of trading. Colors correspond to the respective areas.

Short-term markets for flexibility


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Bids BEM (aFRR) after go-live PICASSO




Currently, for positive and negative reserve energy, the maximum price of $\pm 15,000$ EUR/MWh is practically always offered in the last considered bid, i.e., every lower bid is automatically considered.
⇒ No option from the release of unsuccessful bids from the IDM.


Use Case: Integration of IDM and BEM




Trading volume 15' products DE in $[T - 45, T - 30)$




Trading volume 15' products TNT in $[T - 15, T - 5]$



Trading volume 15' products TNG in $[T - 15, T - 5]$




Market liquidity and order book depth: DE



- Order book snapshots in 1' intervals were constructed from all bids in 2023 for the market area DE (42 GB data); this resulted for the SDAT phase in 43 million data points
- Order book depth = cumulated volume of buy or sell orders
- Relevant for buying and selling of a certain amount X
- An effective transaction price results from the volume-weighted ask- or bid prices of those "best" bids whose cumulated volume equals X

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Bid-Ask-Spreads [EUR/MWh] in $[T - 25, T - 5]$

Tennet balancing area (2023)

time to delivery (min)	Time of day (hours)			
	[0,6)	[6,12)	[12,18)	[18,24)
25	16.32	15.45	16.42	21.79
24	16.40	17.00	17.76	22.82
23	16.50	18.09	18.29	22.26
22	14.66	17.91	16.98	21.07
21	14.62	17.82	16.80	20.43
20	15.22	19.39	17.60	21.94
19	21.14	24.88	23.72	28.38
18	21.27	24.05	24.65	27.90
17	19.66	20.49	22.20	26.25
16	20.22	21.07	22.85	27.20
15	20.93	20.92	22.09	26.32
14	14.92	14.38	15.55	17.82
13	13.79	13.54	14.30	15.35
12	11.70	11.58	11.85	11.97
11	11.80	11.56	12.29	13.37
10	11.67	13.37	14.03	14.65
9	16.17	17.83	19.33	18.68
8	15.78	18.24	17.68	19.06
7	14.20	18.00	18.04	16.78
6	21.32	26.44	27.52	27.54


TransnetBW balancing area (2023)

time to delivery (min)	Time of day (hours)			
	[0,6)	[6,12)	[12,18)	[18,24)
25	81.28	61.36	67.86	96.09
24	87.86	70.47	75.82	104.92
23	87.84	66.31	70.09	105.40
22	77.79	57.81	63.46	86.27
21	70.56	53.87	60.12	83.16
20	67.62	53.34	57.39	82.07
19	186.19	141.02	155.05	213.73
18	187.52	136.54	154.89	213.84
17	162.89	117.09	126.39	182.67
16	160.02	114.01	124.56	173.37
15	157.66	111.70	123.02	167.90
14	285.40	210.46	218.22	296.05
13	264.99	191.05	198.67	269.10
12	198.56	142.91	151.70	195.63
11	183.37	134.69	139.86	178.65
10	183.84	135.27	141.09	179.06
9	247.01	172.44	185.05	244.73
8	188.15	131.80	143.15	186.91
7	171.36	114.58	126.59	164.93
6	170.55	116.73	129.18	166.24

Comparison revenues IDM vs. BEM

- Flexible capacity offered in the last 25' before delivery at IDM or BEM at variable costs (assumption: gas-fired plant)
- Trading volume 1 MW (increase or decrease of generation)
- Different market liquidity in SDAT phase depending on balancing area implies different revenue potential at IDM
- Ex-post calculation of potentially realizable revenues from volume-weighted bid- and ask-prices of derived order books (historic data for 2nd half of 2023):
 - Selling, if ID price (bid) > variable costs
 - Buying, if ID price (ask) < variable costs
- Comparison with revenues from aFRR activations:
 - Provision of positive balancing energy, if CBMP > variable costs
 - Provision of negative balancing energy, if CBMP < variable costs

Comparison revenues IDM vs. BEM



- A bid is placed in the last 25' either at the IDM or the BEM
- Potentially realizable revenues in both markets comparable (exception: illiquid TransnetBW area)
- IDM and BEM similarly attractive
- Providers would have been indifferent in which market they place a bid (or if a bid is transferred to the BEM or remains in the IDM)
- What if a provider bids in the market that appears *currently* more attractive?
- Model-based approach (valuation of both alternatives as financial options)

Valuation as financial options

- Idea: Flexible capacity is comparable to a financial option that is "in the money" when the market price exceeds the strike price (= variable generation cost) for a call option (the opposite for a put option).
 - Value the 15-minute option product on the intraday market (IDM).
 - Expected value = intraday auction price, adjusted for historical spreads.
 - Compare with the option value on the balancing energy market (BEM): 225 options with delivery over 4-second intervals.
 - Expected prices = last known mean CBMP values at activation of POS or NEG (publication with a 15-minute delay).
 - If the latter option is not awarded, one would receive a short-term option on the IDM; this is disregarded (all bids better than $\pm 15,000$ EUR/MWh are accepted).
 - Bid in the market with the higher option value.

Valuation as financial option

- Based on Weber (2015) and BDEW guidelines for the remuneration of redispatch (2018) with opportunity costs from the ID1 price
- Call option: Sale of energy from increased production when the market price exceeds marginal costs (strike X):

$$V_C = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \max(p - X, 0) f_p(p) dp = \dots = \sigma(d\Phi(d) + \phi(d))$$


- Put option: Repurchase of energy and reduction of production when the market price is below marginal costs (strike X):

$$V_P = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \max(X - p, 0) f_p(p) dp = \dots = \sigma(\phi(d) - d\Phi(-d))$$

- $d = \frac{\mu - X}{\sigma}$; Φ, ϕ cdf. /pdf. standard normal distribution

Compensation balancing energy

- Due to the respective ramps, the providers follow the activation signal of the PICASSO platform with a delay (within predefined tolerance bands).
- Only provided energy is compensated at the maximum of cross-border marginal price (CBMP) of the PICASSO platform and the bid price.



Assumptions for calculating option values:

- Provider can adjust performance immediately (according to the Activation Optimization Function, AOF).
- Only CBMP at the time of an activation in German control areas is considered for evaluation.
- A new signal is calculated by the AOF every 4 seconds.
- Volatility is derived from the fluctuation of CBMP around the mean of the corresponding interval.


Assumptions for modelling BE option

- We need a forecast model for the duration of activation (percentage of the 225 options that are exercised during the 15 min period) :


$$P_T^{act,+} = c^+ + a^+ \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,-} + b_1^+ \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,+} + b_2^+ \cdot P_{T-120}^{act,+}$$

$$P_T^{act,-} = c^- + a^- \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,+} + b_1^- \cdot P_{T-60}^{act,-} + b_2^- \cdot P_{T-120}^{act,-}$$

- Low coefficient of determination ($\approx 12\%$)



Revenues combined strategy IDM & BEM



- Bid in market with higher option value
- Model parameters from historical data, 1st half of 2023
- Determination of revenues with realized prices for 2nd half of the year (volume-weighted bid/ask prices IDM; CBMP for balancing energy)
- Figures above the bars show change compared to ID trading
- No improvement in generation (selling at IDM, positive balancing energy) except in "illiquid" regions
- Cause: insufficient predictability of balancing energy activations


Summary

- Use case: Integration of IDM bids into the BEM bid list, considered from the perspective of providers and grid operators
- Model-based approach for deciding which market to bid in; the value of flexibility is modeled analogously to a financial option
- Revenue opportunities in both markets are comparable; suppliers should be indifferent as to whether their bid is passed on to the BEM or remains in the IDM
- By transferring bids from the ID order book to the BEM, its merit order would shift to the right, thus potentially reducing the costs of balancing power
- Potentially available volume is lower than available bids on the RAM; the assumption that all bids $\geq 1\text{MW}$ are prequalified is rather unrealistic
- The attractiveness of the RAM would decrease due to lower compensation for activations; likewise, the liquidity of the IDM would decline

Fundamental model: Variables (Recap.)


- ID prices: aggregated to 1 min time steps (volume-weighted averages)
- Distinction between time to delivery, not products!
- aFRR activation: second-based values from regelleistung.net, aggregated to 1 min
- mFRR activation: sum of values reported by all TSOs (assumption: signal comes 12.5' before 15' delivery period)
- aFRR publication: known 9' after end of 15' delivery period
- mFRR publication: known 0' after end of 15' delivery period
- Control area balance (TSO publication): known 15' after end of 15' delivery period
- **Symmetric imbalance price (TSO publication): known 15' after end of 15' delivery period (NEW)**
- Solar/wind generation (TSO publication): known 60' after end of 15' period
- Load (TSO publication): known 45' after end of 15' period
- Errors for solar/wind/load are differences to day-ahead forecasts
- **Intraday-updated forecasts of wind & solar generation unavailable for 2023**

Comparison of model specifications 2021 vs. 2023



- All data, symmetric errors & infeed
- as (1) w/o aFRR/mFRR activation
- as (1) w/o control area balance
- Full model, asymmetric errors & infeed
- Only aFRR activation

- as (1) w/o aFRR/mFRR publication
- as (1) w/o solar/wind/load errors
- as (1) w/o imbalance price
- Only imbalance price



- Overall lower explanatory power in 2023, also for the model versions aFRR activation is left away
- New variable "imbalance price" alone had higher explanatory power in 2021, but it seems to contribute more than control area balance in 2023

Background


- 2021 and 2023 show similar control area balance deviations, which can be seen as proxy for reserve energy demand
- However, the activated reserve energy volumes activated reported by German TSOs have decreased significantly

	2021		2023	
	POS	NEG	POS	NEG
Total annual aFRR activation [MWh]	850'715	834'019	624'360	763'708
Total annual mFRR activation [MWh]	105'782	54'717	44'483	16'366
Avg. absolute control area balance [MW]	339.64		364.86	

- Effect of more efficient netting and cross-border exchange
- Given the initial hypotheses, less activations mean also that (large German) market participants receive fewer price signals


Example list of bids BEM

RAM-Gebote 30.09.2022, POS_048




Thank you!

Übernahme von ID-Geboten in den RAM



- Betrachtung des Falls, dass Gebote auf der Bid- und Ask-Seite im Orderbuch des Intraday-Markts in T – 31 (unmittelbar vor SDAT-Phase) automatisch in die Gebotsliste für negative und positive Regelarbeit übernommen werden
- Annahme: Alle Gebote $\geq 1\text{ MW}$ sind für aFRR präqualifiziert (Abrundung nicht ganzzahliger Gebote)
- Daraus ergibt sich eine neue Merit-Order für Regelenergie
- Graphik zeigt mittleres Orderbuchvolumen aller Gebote und nur jener $\geq 1\text{MW}$ im Vergleich zu freien Geboten am RAM

Einordnung in Gebotsliste am RAM (Beispiel)



- Zeitscheibe 12:00 – 12:15 am 01.01.2023
- RAM-Gebote für positive Regelarbeit (grau)
- Gebote aus dem ID-Orderbuch (Bid-Seite) nach Regelzonen (farbig)
- Durch die Einordnung zusätzlicher Gebote vom IDM verschiebt sich die Merit-Order-Liste am RAM nach rechts (wenn Preis unverändert)
- Tabelle: Mittlere Veränderung der Preise jener Gebote, die zur Eindeckung von 10%, 15%, 20%, ... der benötigten Kapazität erforderlich sind

	0.1	0.15	0.2	0.25	0.3	0.35	0.4	0.45	0.5	0.55	0.6	0.65	0.7	0.75	0.8	0.85	0.9	0.95	1
POS	-22.04	-7.69	-5.99	-7.79	-8.48	-9.74	-10.94	-14.35	-20.07	-27.00	-44.24	-71.25	-136.98	-287.91	-499.24	-878.10	-1'471	-4'325	-9'744
NEG	19.10	7.62	6.08	6.82	8.73	11.90	16.62	22.88	33.13	68.25	97.95	110.48	131.99	218.00	415.95	809.65	1'406	4'491	8'029

Zusammenfassung

- Integration von Geboten des IDM in Gebotsliste des RAM betrachtet aus Sicht Anbieter u. Netzbetreiber
- Modellbasierter Ansatz für Entscheid, in welchem Markt geboten werden soll; dazu Wert der Flexibilität analog zu Finanzoption modelliert
- Ertragsmöglichkeiten in beiden Märkten vergleichbar, Anbieter sollten indifferent sein, ob ihr Gebot an den RAM weitergegeben wird oder im IDM verbleibt
- Durch die Übernahme von Geboten aus dem ID-Orderbuch in die Gebotsliste des RAM würde sich dessen Merit Order nach rechts verschieben, somit Potenzial für geringere Kosten für Regelarbeit
- Potenziell verfügbares Volumen tiefer als freie Gebote am RAM; dabei ist getroffene Annahme, alle Gebote $\geq 1\text{MW}$ seien präqualifiziert, eher unrealistisch
- Die Attraktivität des RAM würde durch tiefere Vergütung der Abrufe zurückgehen; ebenso würde die Liquidität des IDM sinken